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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of lay-offs, job-to-job movements
and total separations with a unique data set that combines information
on individual firms and their workers. We are in particular interested in
whether the lay-off policy of firms can explain the relatively high level of
unemployment amongst lower educated workers and the relatively strong
sensitivity of their unemployment rate to the business cycle. We find that
lay-off rates decrease with education but that the change over the c!clc  in
the lay-off rate of workers with a lower level of education compared to that
of workers with a higher level of education can not explain the stronger
cyclicality of the unemployment rate for lower educated workers. We con-
clude that this stronger cyclicality is not due to the personnel policy of
firms.
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1 Introduction
In labor economics one may distinguish between theories that focus only on the
stocks of employment and unemployment and theories that view unemployment
as the result of continuous labor turnover.
In the dynamic flow theories of unemployment: worker turnover plays a key
role in explaining the equilibrium level of unemployment (see e.g. the models
with search frictions like those of Pissarides (1990),  and Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994)). The transition rates are in general determined by information
arrival rates, and shocks that influence the profitability of the job. Whereas
most empirical labor market flow studies in the beginning of the nineties focus
on aggregate time series (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond 1990),  more recent studies
benefit from the increased availability of combined worker-firm data sets. The
pioneering work of Dunne et al. (1989) and Davis et al. (1992, 1996a) shows
that aggregate employment outcomes are only the top of the iceberg and that
individual firm data can teach us a lot more about the underlying dynamics of the
aggregate employment rates. The information on individual workers was however
limited in those studies. For instance, it is known which firms shrank (expanded)
but not which workers were laid off or left (were hired).
This paper is an explorative analysis of separation rates at the firm level. The
fact that we observe all separations improves on earlier studies that were based
on net employment changes, i.e. the difference between the inflow and outflow
of workers. Only on the counterfactual assumption that no workers are hired
when firm level employment decreases, we can take the rate of net employment
change as the separation rate. This not only introduces measurement error, but
also gives a highly selective sample, because in that case we only have separation
rates for shrinking firms. A second improvement is that we are able to make a
distinction between transitions to unemployment, i.e. lay-offs, and direct job-to-
job transitions, mostly quits. In some of the search friction models (Pissarides
(1990))  Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) d irect  job-to-job transitions do not oc-
cur. So an indication of the importance of this flow and its sensitivity to the
business cycle is of independent interest. A third improvement is that we can
decompose the separation by a number of worker and job characteristics. In this
paper we are particularly interested in differences in the lay-off rates of lower
and higher educated workers over the business cycle. It is well-known that the
unemployment rate of lower educated workers is more sensitive to the level of
economic activity than the unemployment rate of higher educated workers (see
among others Van Ours and Ridder (1995)). 0 ne explanation of this phenomenon
is that during a downturn firms lay off lower educated workers before higher edu-
cated ones. The reason may be that the firing costs (usually related to the wage)
and rehiring costs (inclusive of training costs) when the economic environment
improves, are higher for workers with more education (see e.g. Pfann and Palm
(1993)). As a consequence, employers hang on to their higher educated workers
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during downturns.
We explore this explanation using individual firm data on lay-offs. We find
that lay-off rates indeed decrease with education. However, the lay-off rate for
higher educated workers in bad years is too large to explain the relatively strong
cyclicality of the unemployment rate for lower educated workers. This implies
that firm employment policies do not explain the stronger sensitivity of the un-
employment rate for lower educated workers to the business cycle. We must look
somewhere else for an explanation, e.g. re-employment rates of lower and higher
educated workers.
The passive attitude of firms when confronted with a change in the level
of economic activity is confirmed by the increase in the direct job-to-job flow
rate during an upturn. This increase is even larger for higher than for lower
educated workers. If the firing and rehiring costs are indeed larger for higher
educated workers, then it is surprising that firms are not interested in or capable
of reducing the large job-to-job flow rate of higher educated workers during boom
years. It is interesting to note that the total separation rate does not change much
with the level of economic activity, but its composition does. Moreover, the total
separation rate decreases with education.
To study those issues, we use a relatively new and largely unexplored firm-
worker data set that covers the entire Dutch economy. The data were originally
collected to obtain information on the development of wage income for different
categories of workers and are based on administrative records of individual firms.
Important advantages of this data set are that there are very few missing ob-
servations and that it contains detailed information on the inflow and outflow of
workers.
The main disadvantages are that the two step stratified sampling procedure
is rather complex and that we have no information on some firm outcomes like
profits, value product, investments and the stock of capital. Also the data only
cover four years 1993-1996. Fortunately, 1993 was a year with a lower level of
economic activity than 1996, so that we are able to answer some of the questions
raised above.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the construction of
the data set and give some descriptive statistics. In section 3 we study the total
separation rate and the lay-off and direct job-to-job transition rates. Section 4
contains some conclusions.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data
For this paper we have used the AVO (Arbeidsvoorwaarden Onderzoek) data set
of the Department of Social Affairs and Employment which covers the period
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1992-96. The data were collected by means of a two step sampling procedure.
In the first step, a number of firms was drawn from the Department of Social
Affairs own firm register which is roughly similar to the firm register of the CBS
(Statistics Netherlands), using a stratified (by industry and firm size) design.’
The number of strata changed between surveys. In 1993, the sample consisted
of 1682 firms which were drawn from 80 strata, in 1994 of 1563 firms from 280
strata, in 1995 of 1375 firms from 312 strata, and in 1996 of 1548 firms from 328
strata.
At the second stage, a sample of workers was drawn in October of the year
of the survey. In the sequel the year in which the sample is drawn is denoted
by t. For the workers in the sample, information was collected from the wage
administration of the firm, both for years t and t-l (if they were employed at the
firm in both years; the information for year t-l is also for October). In addition,
the number of workers who had left the firm between October of year t-l and
October of year t was registered. To obtain information on workers who had left
the firm, a random sample was drawn from these employees. In addition to the
information that was collected for all sampled employees, the new labor market
position was registered for the employees who had left the firm. The sample size
was increased if certain conditions were not met. *
The two-stage sampling design is rather complex. At the firm level it results in
random samples from the employees present in October of year t and the workers
hired3 in the previous year .4 If needed, sampling weights that are obtained by
multiplying the inverse of the probability that the firm of the employee is in the
sample and the inverse of the probability that the employee is selected from all
the employees of this firm, can be used to obtain sample statistics that refer to
either the population of employees present in years t and t-l, the inflow, or the
outflow. For firm variables, the sampling weight is equal to the first factor.
In the AVO the employee and job characteristics that are registered are: gross
wages, overtime payments, hours worked, profit shares, education, age, tenure,
gender, occupation, type of contract, job complexity level. Some wage related
variables and hours  worked  are available for October of year t and year t-l.
Job characteristics, as the complexity of the job, were  only registered in year
‘Firms from the service sector and semi-public sectors were included in all samples. Since
the 1993 sample contained no information on public sector workers, we excluded this sector
from the other samples as well.
2At  least 10 employees had to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 10 not;
the minimal number of employees present in October of year t and t-l, the number of workers
hired in this period and the number of workers who separated in this period had to be at least
8. If one of these conditions was not satisfied the sample size was increased.
3However, we do not know the number nor the characteristics of employees who were hired
after October of year t-l, but left the firm before October  of year t.
4To  be precise: because of the additional requirements, the design results in random samples
from subgroups of workers distinguished by presence in October of year t or t-l, or both and
covered by collective bargaining (or not).
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t -  1 for separating workers and in t for the other workers. This precludes
the study of promotion within the firm. The data also contain information on
various separation routes like lay-offs, transitions into other jobs, disability inflow,
and early and normal retirement. Remember that this information comes from
administrative records of firms, and that it is therefore limited by the scope of the
firm’s administration. For example, a worker who is given notice of lay-off in the
near future may immediately quit and take another job to avoid unemployment.
In this case, the worker is most likely to be recorded as a job-to-job mover,
without any reference to the lay-off. However, a worker who stays with the firm
until the date of lay-off is most likely to be recorded as a laid-off worker. The
data do not provide information of the labor market state just after the lay-off.
For a detailed description of the job complexity and education levels we refer to
the appendix and to Venema (1997).
The main advantage of the AVO data is that we observe both worker and
firm characteristics but the AVO also has a number of limitations. The complex
sample design results in a large variation in the sampling probabilities and, as a
consequence, in the corresponding sampling weights. This may magnify (small)
biases in the firm register from which the sample was drawn. Indeed, a comparison
of estimated population averages for some worker and firm variables obtained
using these weights and the estimated population averages for the same variables
obtained from the Dutch labor force survey (EBB) reveals substantial differences
(Gautier (1998)). Almost all differences are eliminated if we remove employees
with sampling weights that are larger than 500 (about 5% of the sample in each
year). These workers are employed in small firms in industries with relatively few
firms. s
Table 1 gives estimated population averages for some variables. Most averages
do not change much over the years. Even after the correction for extreme sample
weights, the firm size distribution is still off in 1993. This is a reason to include
firm size in all regression equations, on the assumption that the selection is on
this variable.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
3 Who separates and why?
As a first pass, we consider the yearly separation rates by level of education for
the years 1993-96 (Table 2). 6 In 1993 the level of economic activity was lower
than in 1996. This is confirmed by the lower lay-off rate and the higher job-to-job
5An  alternative would be to include a full set of industry and firm size dummies in the
regression equations. Because of the small number of firms (and workers) in the omitted strata,
this gives the same result as omitting the observations in these strata.
6We  focus on ay-1 offs and job to job movements. For a discussion of worker displacement in
the Netherlands, we refer to Abbring et al. (1998).
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transition rate in 1996. The change in the total separation rate over these years
is smaller than that of its components, the lay-off rate and the direct job-to-job
transition rate. In all years the lay-off rate decreases with the level of education.
This is consistent with higher firing and rehiring costs for workers with a higher
level of education (Pfann and Palm (1993)). There is abundant evidence that the
sensitivity of the unemployment rate to changes in the level of economic activity
decreases with the level of education (Van Ours and Ridder (1995)). The concen-
tration of unemployment among lower-educated workers is socially undesirable.
A number of explanations have been proposed for this concentration. An expla-
nation that is popular in Europe, but less so in the US, is that during downturns
workers with more schooling crowd out workers with less schooling. Employers
who receive many applications for their job vacancies order applicants on the
basis of easily measurable characteristics as education. Van Ours and Ridder
(1995) and Gautier et al. (1998) review the evidence. -4  second explanation is
that during downturns employers hang on to their higher educated workers. If
they have to reduce their work force, they lay off lower educated workers. The
reason for this behavior may be that the firing costs for higher educated workers
are higher, and that employers expect to pay higher rehiring and training costs
for these workers, when the economy improves.
To explore whether the lay-off rates in Table 2 can explain the higher volatility
of the unemployment rate of lower educated workers, we consider the well-known
stock-flow identity for unemployment,
in which Ijk(t) denotes the number of unemployed workers at time t with edu-
cation level Ic,  Ik(t)  denotes the inflow at t of such workers, and &(t) denotes
the mean unemployment duration at t among such workers. Equation (1) is an
identity if the inflow into and outflow out of unemployment are constant and
equal up to time t.
More generally, it is a good first-order approximation in a non-stationary
environment. It is useful to go into this in some more detail. Suppose for the
moment that the inflow into unemployment consists of lay-offs which occur at the
rate s,(t), and that the outflow out of unemployment occurs at the rate X,(t). It
is not difficult to see that then, for any given level of education Ic,
Uk(t) =  im (Mk(t  - T)  - uk(t  - T)) 6k(t  - T)  eXp  ( -  Jt Xk(?+h)  dr
t--r
where Mk(t) denotes the size of the labor force at t with level of education Ic.  If
hfk(t),  b,(t),  and x,(t) are constant over time then a solution to this equation is
given by
Uk(t) =  uk =  [hk(Mk  - uk)] $
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which replicates equation (1). Moreover, this outcome is often a good approxi-
mation to the true outcome if the rate at which Mk(t),  6k(t),  and A,(t)  vary over
time is much smaller than the value of XI,  itself, for in that case most currently
unemployed workers have been in a more or less stationary environment. Now
recall that we are concerned with business cycle fluctuations of the inflow into
and the outflow out of unemployment, and that we examine lay-offs of previously
employed workers. The mean unemployment duration among the latter group
is substantially lower than the mean among the population of the unemployed,
and is generally much less than a year. This is of course much smaller than
the duration of a full business cycle; so that the approximation (1) seems to be
justified.
Let us return to the original formulation of equation (1). If we divide this by
the number of employed workers at t with level of education Ic,  we obtain
dt)
1 - Uk(t)
= pk(t)Dk(t)
where, for given t and Ic,  ?&(t)  denotes the unemployment rate and pk(t) denotes
the ratio of the number of individuals who flow into unemployment and the
number of employed workers (in terms of the above notation, u&(t)  = uk(t)/Mk(t)
and  pk(t)  = Ik(t)/(Mk(t) - uk(t>)). If we assume for the moment that the inflow
into unemployment consists exclusively of lay-offs, we may set pk(t) equal to the
corresponding lay-off rate (i.e., to &k(t)).
Suppose we calculate the ratio of the left-hand side of equation (2) for lower
(numerator) and higher (denominator) educated workers. This can of course be
done for a “good” year (1996) and for a “bad” year (1993). The ratio for 1993
is larger than for 1996, which should be expected given the higher level and the
higher degree of cyclicality of unemployment among lower educated workers. 7
Now consider the corresponding ratios of the right-hand side of equation (2).
In fact, we can only quantify the ratios of the lay-off rates (for different years).
To separate the effect of the lay-off rate we assume that the average duration
of unemployment is constant over the cycle. It turns out that the ratio of the
lay-off rates is 1.1 in 1993 and 2.4 in 1996.8  Consequently, the latter ratio moves
in a direction which is opposite to the direction of the movement of the ratio of
the left-hand side of (2). In words, the difference in unemployment cyclicality
between higher and lower educated workers cannot be explained by differences
in lay-off cyclicality. The number of lay-offs of higher educated workers in bad
7Combining  the employment figures of the AVO and labor force figures (by education) of
Statistics Netherlands, we calculated this ratio to be about 10 % higher in 1993 than in 1996.
In Gautier et al. (1998) we give other evidence that 1993 was a relatively bad year in terms
of V/U ratio’s and employment opportunities, in particular for the workers with only primary
education.
81f  we compare downturns (93,94)  with upswings (94,95),  the difference in the ratio of lay-off
rates for higher and lower educated workers is even larger.
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times is simply too large for this. Interestingly, this is in accordance with the
empirical evidence based on micro worker data. Imbens and Lynch (1992),  Baker
(1992))  and Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (1998) show that the distribution
of the level of education among the inflow into unemployment does not change
markedly over the business cycle.
We conclude from the above that the concentration of unemployment among
lower educated workers during downturns is not due to the personnel policy of
employers. According to equation (2),  this means that the difference in unemploy-
ment cyclicality between higher and lower educated workers must be explained
by differences in cyclicality in their mean unemployment durations.
A weak point in this argument is that part of the inflow into unemployment
consists of individuals who did not have a job, but were at school or are re-
entrants into the labor force. This inflow is procyclical, but its size is too small
(relative to employment) to change the argument. In particular, the lay-off rate
of higher educated workers in 1993 is just too large for this inflow to make a
difference.
The change over the years in the direct job-to-job flow rate gives indirect
support to the hypothesis that employers do not treat higher educated workers
differently from lower educated workers during the cycle. One would expect that
in boom years employers would like to retain higher educated workers. One  wa>
to achieve this would be to raise their wages relative to lower educated workers.
Table 2 shows that in boom years firms are not able to retain high skilled workers.
Their job-to-job flow rate increases even more than that of low skilled workers.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
As noted in section 2, some of the trends observed in Table 2 may be spuri-
ous. The complex two-stage sample design may bias some of the estimates. In
particular, the results for 1993 seem to be out of line. To investigate whether
the conclusion reached above is affected by these potential biases, we analyze the
individual data. In particular, we estimate logit  models for the dummy depen-
dent variables being laid off (or not) and making a direct job-to-job transition (or
not). The independent variables are a dummy for the years with a low level of
economic activity and a dummy for the level of education. In addition we include
a number of variables (industry, firm size dummies) that determine the sampling
probability in order to eliminate biases due to the sample design. Finally, we
include some additional explanatory variables that are of independent interest
(age, tenure, gender, part-time job, type of wage contract, job complexity level,
occupation). In Table 3 and in the appendix, we give a short description of some
of the variables we have used in our regressions
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
From Table 4 we see that the estimates for the year dummies and the levels
of education replicate the patterns found in Table 2 and we conclude that these
patterns are not spurious. Before we turn to the education estimates, we first
discuss the estimates of the coefficients of the other independent variables.
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TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 5 gives some simulated probabilities for the mean worker. Those were
calculated as follows. First, we use our estimates to compute lay-off, job to job,
total separation and conditional lay-off probabilities. We evaluate those proba-
bilities at the estimated parameter values and the mean observed characteristics
over the period 1993-96. Next, we vary specific characteristics of workers, jobs
and firms and keep the other characteristics constant to get an idea of the partial
effects.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
The lay-off probability is highest for male workers with tenure of 2 years,
who have a full time contract, have followed a lower education, and have no
collective wage agreement. Workers employed at large firms face higher lay-off
rates and move more often to a new job than workers employed at small firms.g
In addition we see that lay-off and total separation rates for commercial jobs are
particular high while managers face the smallest probability of being laid 0ff.i’
It is also interesting to see that job complexity levels hardly contribute to the
explanation of separation rates. All job complexity level dummies are statistically
insignificant. Hence, lower educated workers face higher lay-off rates at all job
levels.
The current successful performance of the Dutch economy has sometimes been
attributed to the fact that wage bargaining takes place at an aggregate level and
that therefore many appropriability problems are interna1ized.i’  Our results show
that workers with a collective wage agreement face a smaller probability to be
laid off and move less often to a new job. A possible explanation for this fact is
that firms and workers with a collective wage contract invest more in firm specific
capital than workers with a bilateraly bargained wage contract and will therefore
stay together as long as possible. On the other hand, it can be caused by the
fact that workers with a collectively bargained wage are employed in strongly
unionized sectors. Burgess (1986) also finds evidence for Britain that unions
can impose costs on firms wishing to lay off workers. Turning to the education
estimates we see that workers with a lower education still face higher lay-off
probabilities but the differences with higher educated workers are small now.
We also tested whether our findings that lay-off rates for lower educated work-
ers are not more cyclical than for higher educated workers and that firms do not
try (or are not able) to keep their higher educated workers in good times, still
gThis  should not be interpreted as evidence for the “conventional wisdom” that small firms
are the engines of job growth because regression-to-the -mean-effects cause large firms to shrink
on average and small firms to grow on average, see also Davis et al. (1996b).
loThose results are not changed when gross hourly wages are included as explanatory variables
in the regressions. Low wage workers face much higher layoff rates than high wage workers.
‘lFor  a clear discussion of the macroeconomic implications of appropriability problems and
specificity, see e.g. Caballero and Hammour (1996).
holds after we control for other factors, which is the case.i*  Hence, the earlier
conclusion regarding the role of personnel policy in the concentration of unem-
ployment among lower educated workers during downturns is confirmed.
The analysis also confirms the well-known fact that job-to-job-movements are
strongly pro-cyclical. In addition we find that having a university degree, being
male, having little (but more than 1 year) tenure, and being employed at a large
firm increases the probability to move to a new job.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the factors that determine lay-offs, job to job movements and
total separations with a data set that combines information on both individual
firms and workers. The advantage of using combined information on firms and
workers is that we can study the partial effects of factors which are believed
to be important in explaining separations. We find that workers with a lower
level of education face higher lay-off probabilities both in good times and in bad
times. We did not find evidence that the lay-off rate for lower educated workers
is more cyclical than for higher educated workers. Therefore, the concentration
of unemployment among lower educated workers during downturns is not due to
the lay-off policy of employers. In addition we found that having a collectively
bargained wage contract and/or having been on the job for a long time (which is
of course partly endogenous) strongly decreases the lay-off probability, and to a
lesser extent, the probability to directly move to a new job. The effects of macro-
economic conditions is also quite large. In particular, the conditional lay-off rate
is almost 4 times as high during downturns as during booms.
121n the lay-off estimate, the cross-effect-dummy of an economic downturn and years of
education is even positive (0.03 (0.02)) but statistically not significant. Job-to-job movements
fall relatively strongly for higher educated workers during cyclical downturns the estimate of a
downturn*years of education dummy is -0.02 (0.01).
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AVO data
The AVO data were collected by the Dutch “Labor inspection” (AI) which is
part of the department of Social Affairs and contains administrative data from
workers employed in both the private and the public sector. For our analysis
we only used workers who were employed in the private sector. Below we give
a more detailed description on the construction of some of the key variables, see
also Venema (1997).
Job complexity levels
fl Very simple activities which do not change over time. No schooling is neces-
sary and only limited experience. The activities are under direct supervi-
sion.
f2 Simple activities which are in general repeating. Some (lower) administrative
or technical knowledge and experience is required. In general the activities
take place under direct supervision.
Intermediate
f3  Less simple activities which do not repeat themselves continuously. Admin-
istrative or technical knowledge is required and the activities are partly
without direct supervision.
f4 More difficult (non-repeating) activities for which an intermediate level of
education is required. In general the activities take place without direct
supervision.
High
f5  Activities within a certain field which require a higher level of knowledge and
experience. The activities take place without direct supervision.
f6 Managing activities of an analytical, creative or contact nature, which are
undertaken independently and require an university or comparable level.
f7  Managers of intermediate companies or comparable plants, departments etc.
who also participate in decision making.
f8  Managers of large companies or comparable plants or departments.
In this paper we merged f7 and f8 and when reported f6-8  because of the
few observations in f8 and f7
1 3
Education
We have information on 7 types of schooling (total years, including the required
schooling to enter a particular type of education, between brackets):
Lower: primary (6),  lower general (10) and lower vocational (10)
Intermediate: intermediate general (12))  intermediate vocational (14)
Higher higher vocational (15) and university (16).
separation
Workers not older than 60 years who left a firm because of (early) retirement,
disability, and of test-period, lay-off, reported to have found a new job or ini-
tially hired from a temporary employment office. We do not observe movements
between jobs within firms.
inflow
Workers who enter a new firm. Again, we do not observe within firm labour
flows.
tenure:
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling date).
w a g e
Monthly wages (including over-time payments, profits shares etc.) and hours
worked are measured very accurately. We calculated nominal gross hourly wages
for each worker and deflated the wage by the consumer price index to obtain real
wages.
occupation
We have information on the following occupations : (1) simple technical activi-
ties, (2) administrative, (3) information technology, (4) commercial, (5) service
orientated, (6) creative. (7) management.
sector
Although the AVO data contain information on the public sector we restricted
our analysis to the private sector. We distinguish 12 sectors. (1) agriculture and
fishing, (2) food, (3) chemical, (4) metal, (5) tho er industry, (6) construction,
(7) trade, (8) hotels, restaurants catering, (9) transport, communication, (10)
banking and insurance, (11) other services, (12) health care
firm size
We have used the following size classes. (1) l-9 , (2) 10-19, (3) 20-49 (4),  50-99,
(5)100-199,  (6) 200-499, (7) 2 500 employees.
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A Tables
variable
Table 1: AVO data: weig
workers employed at shrinking firm (%)
workers employed at growing firm (%)
female (%)
inflow (% of total employment)
separation (% of total employment)
(semi) collective wage agreement ( %)
age (years)
completed education (years)
real gross hourly wage (Dutch guilders)
tenure (years)
firm size (1-19 employees)
firm size (20-49 employees)
firm size (50-99 employees)
firm size (loo-199 employees)
firm size (200-499 employees)
firms (>  500 employees)
# workers
# firms
ote: source: Labor Inspection, AVO 1997. Indiv
ted me
93
30.6
33.2
37.1
11.8
11.0
74.1
35.8
11.2
25.9
7.5
87.8 79.7
7.1 12.5
2.2 4.3
1 . 1 1.9
0.8 1.1
0.3 0.4
24053 31250
1682 1563
ns 199
94
30.4
39.0
35.6
10.8
8.7
78.7
35.9
11.2
24.1
8.0
ual records are w
-96
95
24.6
44.8
37.7
13.4
9.6
77.0
36.0
11.3
26.7
7.5- -
80.8
11.4
4.4
1.7
1.0
0.5
26059
1375
ghted b:
96
26.5
41.6
36.0
13.8
10.0
76.4
36.0
11.5
27.2
7.8
81.0
11.1
3.3
1.6
1.1
0.7
36380
1548
ndividu l*firm
weights, firm records are weighted by firm weights
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Table 2: Yearly outflow rates by level of education ( in % )
n education
lower intermediate higher
lay-off
93- 8.3 7.2 7.7
94 2.6 1.4 1.2
95 2.1 1 . 5 2.1
96 2.4 1.4 1.0
to other job
93 1.5 0.9 0.8
94 4 . 4 3.9 4.2
95 5 . 8 5.1 6.0
96 5.8 6.0 6.3
total separation
93 12.7 10.2 10.5
9 4 10.4 7.6 7.7
95 , 11.3 , 9.0 , 10.0 ,,
96 ) 11.4 1 9.7 1 9.4
Source: Labor Inspection AVO 1997
Table 3: Short description of variables used in the regressions.
1 job complexity level 1 Job complexity levels are based on the complexity
wage agreement
part/full time
cyclical downturn
of the activities and the amount of supervision required.
We distinguish 3 types of wage contracts. Most
workers have a collective wage agreement (CAO)
which is determined by sectoral  level bargaining.
The minister of social affairs has the right to force
all firms within a sector to pay the same collectively
bargained wage (AVV) and finally there are workers
who have a bilateraly bargained wage contract. Those
workers are in general employed at higher positions.
Part-time refers to working less than 100% of the
regular number of hours.
Periods in which employment shrinks (93, 94)
Note: See also the appendix
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Table 4: Regression coefficients (standard errors) logit model lay-off and direct
job to job transition (N=116378)\ ,
constant
downturn (93,94)
log (age)
log2 (age)
log (tenure)
log2  ( tenure)
female
part time
wage contract
collective (CAO)
extended (CAO)
education
primary
lower general
lower vocational
interm.  general
interm.  vocat ional
higher vocational
job complexity
f l
f2
f3
f4
f5
f6
occupation
simple technical
administrative
management
service oriented
commercial
creative
firm size
10-19
20-49
50-99
100-199
200-499
> 500
-2 log likelihood
-0.08 (0.06)
-0.13 (0.05)
-0.28 (0.06)
-0.12 (0.07)
-0.04 (0.06)
0.28 (0.06) 1
31334.3 1 38767.2
.cluding  industry dummies. Age an1NoteSource  Labor Inspection, AVO 1997. In d tenure are
measured in years. Reference groups: no collective wage agreement, full time, male, university,
job complexity level 7,8, IT , agriculture/mining, firm size smaller than 10.
lay-off
1.45 (2.36)
1.02 (0.04)
-2.91 (1.30)
0.38 (0.19)
0.53 (0.04)
-0.42 (0.02)
-0.23 (0.05)
-0.27 (0.05)
-0.20 (0.05)
-0.11 (0.08)
0.40 (0.16)
0.26 (0.15)
0.28 (0.15)
0.10 (0.15)
0.12 (0.15)
0.08 (0.14)
0.29 (0.72)
0.78 (0.71)
0.62 (0.71)
0.48 (0.71)
0.82 (0.71)
0.93 (0.71)
0.26 (0.15)
0.27 (0.15)
-0.29 (0.18)
0.16 (0.15)
0.46 (0.16)
-0.10 (0.23)
-0.73 (0.03)
-0.24 (1.20)
-0.12 (0.17)
0.99 (0.04)
-0.46 (0.01)
-0.16 (0.04)
-0.36 (0.04)
-0.02 (0.04)
-0.08 (0.07)
-0.23 (0.12)
-0.41 (0.11)
-0.47 (0.11)
-0.53 (0.11)
-0.54 (0.10)
-0.35 (0.10)
0.35 (0.36)
0.06 (0.35)
0.01 (0.35)
0.02 (0.35)
-0.23 (0.34)
-0.20 (0.34)
-0.22 (0.10)
-0.05 (0.11)
0.20 (0.12)
-0.10 (0.11)
0.07 (0.11)
0.01 (0.16)
-0.11 (0.05)
-0.23 (0.05)
-0.34 (0.06)
-0.37 (0.06)
-0.27 (0.06)
0.18 (0.05)
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Table 5: AVO data: Simulated probabilities (in %)
variable 1ay:off  direct job io  job
total population 3.90 5.92
downturn (93-94) 6.33 4.18
upswing (95-96) 2.38 8.31
job complexity level
simple (fl, f2) 4.08 6.67
intermediate (f3,f4) 3.70 5.95
complex (f5-f8) 4.41 4.92
education
lower 4.20 5.96
intermediate 3.54 5.37
higher 3.51 5.75
age (years)
2 0 4.86 9.91
4 0 3.80 5.07
6 0 3.87 3.21
tenure (years)
1 4.25 3.76
2 4.98 5.86
5 3.39 5.52
1 0 1.60 3.22
female 3.38 5.39
male 4.22 6.27
collective (CAO) 3.71 5.91
extended (CAO) 4.04 5.57
no collective wage agreement 4.49 6.01
firm size (l-99) 3.50 5.57 1
i
1 firm size (>  100) 4.22 1 6.11
Note: All simulations are based on simple logit estimates evaluated over the average character-
istics of the labor force over the period 1993-96. When cells are merged (i.e. fl,f2 and primary,
lower general, lower vocational), we weight by average cell side. The estimations also included
sector and occupation dummies, see Table 4
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